Antitrust Enforcement

Core Principle

Markets require competition to function. Monopolies extract rents, stifle innovation, exploit workers, and accumulate dangerous political power. When markets concentrate, democratic governance must intervene to restore competition.

Tech Platform Monopolies

The Problem

Platform power exceeds traditional monopolies:

• Gatekeeper control: Control access to markets, can exclude competitors
• Self-preferencing: Run marketplace AND compete in it, unfair advantage
• Data moats: Accumulate user data competitors can't match
• Network effects: More users = more value = harder for competitors to start
• Vertical integration: Control multiple layers of stack, leverage across them

Breakup Targets

Market dominance triggers structural remedies. Companies with >40% market share in critical categories face breakup review.

Market Structure Rules

Bright-line prohibitions prevent monopolistic behavior:

No platform self-preferencing:

• If you run marketplace, cannot also compete on it
• Amazon cannot preference Amazon Basics over third-party sellers
• Google cannot put own products at top of search results
• Apple cannot preference Apple Music in App Store rankings
• Penalty: $10M per violation + disgorgement of profits

No predatory acquisitions:

• Dominant platforms (>30% market share) cannot acquire competitors with >5M users
• Presumption: All such acquisitions anti-competitive unless proven otherwise
• Burden on acquirer to show benefits outweigh harm
• Facebook buying Instagram/WhatsApp would be blocked under this rule

No exclusive dealing:

• Cannot require exclusivity as condition of service
• Microsoft cannot require Office to only work with Azure
• Apple cannot block apps from mentioning competitor services
• Google cannot require Android phone makers to include all Google apps

No tying/bundling:

• Cannot force customers to take Product B to get Product A
• Amazon cannot require sellers to use Amazon logistics
• Google cannot bundle Chrome with Android as requirement
• Exception: If unbundling would genuinely break functionality (burden on company to prove)

Payment Infrastructure Monopolies

The Visa/Mastercard Duopoly

Payment networks control access to the financial system itself. Visa and Mastercard process ~90% of US card transactions, creating unique dangers beyond typical monopoly harms.

Three Critical Problems

1. Economic Extraction

• ~$100 billion annually in transaction fees in US alone
• 2-3% cost on every purchase (passed to consumers)
• Zero marginal cost to process transactions, but fees never decrease
• Small businesses pay disproportionately high rates
• Duopoly pricing (Visa and Mastercard don't compete on price)

2. Censorship Power

• Can financially deplatform legal businesses
• Adult content platforms forced to restrict legal content under threat of payment cutoff
• Cannabis businesses (legal in many states) denied banking access
• Political organizations deplatformed based on advocacy group pressure
• Gun sellers, kratom vendors, CBD companies face arbitrary restrictions
• No due process, no appeals, no accountability

3. Privatized Constitutional Violations

• Government cannot censor speech (First Amendment)
• But private payment processors can financially deplatform you
• Result: Legal businesses cut off from economy for political/moral reasons
• End run around constitutional protections
• Private companies doing what government cannot

Solution: Common Carrier Regulation

Treat payment networks like utilities. Historical precedent: telephone companies, railroads, postal service, internet backbone providers.

Common carrier obligations:

Must-serve requirement:

• Cannot refuse to serve legal businesses
• If you're licensed, paying taxes, following laws → payment networks must serve you
• Cannot discriminate based on what you sell (if legal)

Content neutrality:

• Cannot refuse service based on:
  • Moral objections to products/services
  • Political pressure from advocacy groups
  • Religious concerns about content
  • Desire to avoid controversy
  • Disagreement with business practices
• Can refuse only for:
  • Actual illegal activity (with legal process, not just accusations)
  • Excessive fraud/chargebacks (defined threshold, e.g., >2% of transactions)
  • Non-payment of fees
  • Technical security concerns (documented risk)

Transparent pricing:

• Published rate schedules (no secret deals)
• Cannot charge different rates for same-size merchants without justification
• Rate increases require regulatory approval
• Fees must be cost-based, not profit-maximizing

Due process requirements:

• 30-day notice before termination
• Specific reasons for termination (in writing)
• Appeals process (independent review)
• Cannot terminate during appeal
• Burden on payment network to justify termination

Enforcement

FTC/CFPB authority:

• Investigate complaints of discriminatory termination
• Impose fines for violations
• Order reinstatement of wrongly terminated businesses
• Pattern of abuse triggers breakup review

Penalties:

• $500,000 per violation (per business wrongly terminated)
• Triple damages to affected business (compensatory + punitive)
• Injunctive relief (immediate reinstatement)
• Systematic violations → structural breakup

Private right of action:

• Businesses can sue payment networks directly
• Attorney fees awarded to prevailing plaintiff
• Class action eligible (multiple businesses harmed by same policy)

Public Infrastructure Alternative

Expand Federal Reserve's FedNow system to consumer payments:

FedNow Consumer Payment Network:

• Government-operated payment network competing with Visa/Mastercard
• Real-time payments (instant settlement)
• Cost-recovery pricing only (not profit-maximizing)
• Fees: 0.1-0.5% (vs. 2-3% for Visa/MC)
• Cannot discriminate against legal businesses (bound by First Amendment)

Public debit card:

• Government-issued debit card linked to FedNow network
• Available to all citizens and legal residents
• Merchants required to accept (like cash)
• No annual fees, no overdraft fees, no hidden charges

Benefits:

• Competition: Forces Visa/Mastercard to lower fees or lose market share
• No censorship: Government bound by Constitution, cannot discriminate
• Financial inclusion: Unbanked populations get payment access
• National security: Critical infrastructure not dependent on private companies
• Privacy: Government transactions require warrant (Fourth Amendment protection)

Implementation timeline:

• Year 1: Common carrier legislation passes, FedNow consumer expansion funded
• Year 2: Public debit cards issued, merchant acceptance mandated
• Year 3: 20-30% market share, private fees declining in response
• Year 4+: Competitive equilibrium, private networks compete on service

Interoperability Requirements

Any card must work on any network:

• Like phone carriers (can call across networks)
• Merchants can route to cheapest network
• New payment networks can enter market easily
• Competition on price and service, not lock-in

Technical standards:

• Open protocols for payment processing
• Network-to-network communication requirements
• Security standards maintained (PCI-DSS)
• Reduces barriers to entry for new competitors

AI Infrastructure Competition

The Urgency Problem

AI monopolies are forming right now. Without intervention, we're watching the next generation of monopolies consolidate in real time. This is more time-sensitive than historical antitrust cases.

The AI Stack

Four layers where monopoly power is concentrating:

1. Computing Layer (Hardware)

• Problem: Nvidia >90% market share in AI GPUs
• Why it matters: Training large models requires thousands of GPUs
• Barrier: CUDA software lock-in (everyone develops for Nvidia)
• Result: Nvidia can tax entire AI industry

2. Cloud Layer (Infrastructure)

• Problem: AWS, Azure, Google Cloud control access to computing
• Why it matters: Can't train models without massive compute clusters
• Barrier: Capital costs ($billions for data centers)
• Result: Cloud providers gatekeepers to AI development

3. Model Layer (Foundation Models)

• Problem: OpenAI, Anthropic, Google dominating foundation models
• Why it matters: Training costs = barrier to entry ($100M+ per model)
• Barrier: Data access, compute access, expertise concentration
• Result: Few players control AI capabilities

4. Application Layer

• Problem: ChatGPT/Claude become defaults, network effects kick in
• Why it matters: First mover advantage in AI applications
• Barrier: User data, integration into platforms, brand recognition
• Result: Winner-take-most in AI applications

Intervention Strategies

Prevent vertical integration:

• Cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP) cannot own model companies
• Model companies cannot control computing hardware
• Keep layers separate to prevent leverage across stack
• Example: Microsoft investment in OpenAI requires scrutiny

Compute antitrust:

• Break Nvidia's GPU monopoly or mandate interoperability
• CUDA alternatives must work (open standards)
• AMD, Intel forced access to necessary patents/tech
• Public investment in GPU manufacturing (CHIPS Act model)
• Export controls cannot create domestic monopoly

Data access requirements:

• Training data sources must be accessible to competitors
• Cannot create data moat through exclusive access
• Public datasets for AI training (like research access)
• Web crawling cannot be monopolized by incumbents

Model openness (debated):

• Option A: Models above certain size must publish weights (open source)
• Option B: License at reasonable rates to competitors (FRAND terms)
• Option C: No requirements, but breakup if dominant
• Tradeoff: Competition vs. safety concerns (powerful open models = risk?)

Acquisition prohibitions:

• Major tech platforms cannot acquire AI model companies
• Google/Microsoft/Amazon/Meta/Apple = prohibited acquirers
• Exception: Minority investments with no board seats or control
• Prevents incumbents from buying way to AI dominance

Timeline

This cannot wait for traditional antitrust timeline (5-10 years).

• Year 1: Emergency AI competition framework passed
• Year 1-2: Review and block anti-competitive AI acquisitions
• Year 2: Mandate compute interoperability (break CUDA lock-in)
• Year 2-3: Structural separations if vertical integration detected
• Year 3+: Monitor for re-concentration, adjust rules as needed

Interoperability Mandates

Three Levels of Interoperability

Level 1: Data Portability

• What: You can export YOUR data and take it elsewhere
• Example: Download all Facebook posts, photos, friend list → import to competitor
• Standard: Open data format (JSON, CSV), API access
• Timeline: Mandatory Year 1 for all platforms >10M users

Level 2: Service Interoperability

• What: Different platforms can communicate with each other
• Example: WhatsApp users can message Signal users (like email between providers)
• Precedent: Telecom (different carriers can call each other), email
• Technical: Shared protocols (ActivityPub for social, standard messaging protocols)
• Timeline: Mandatory Year 2-3 for messaging, social platforms

Level 3: Infrastructure Access

• What: Competitors can use dominant infrastructure at fair prices
• Example: Third-party sellers can use Amazon logistics without selling on Amazon marketplace
• Precedent: Telecom "common carrier" requirements, railroad access
• Challenge: Pricing regulation needed (what's "fair"?)
• Timeline: Year 3+ with heavy regulatory oversight

Implementation

Standards bodies:

• Independent technical committees define protocols
• Open standards process (no single company control)
• Regular updates as technology evolves
• Industry participation required but no veto power

Enforcement:

• APIs must be documented, stable, and equivalent to internal use
• Cannot degrade competitor access vs. own products
• Performance monitoring (response times, reliability)
• Penalties for non-compliance: $1M per day + damages

Merger Policy

Presumptive Blocking

Current system broken: most anti-competitive mergers get approved. Shift burden of proof.

Automatic review triggers:

• Acquiring company has >30% market share in any relevant market
• Target company has >5M users or >$100M revenue
• Combined company would have >40% market share
• Horizontal merger in concentrated market (HHI >2500)
• Vertical merger that forecloses >15% of market

Presumed anti-competitive (must prove otherwise):

• Dominant platform acquiring potential competitor
• Any acquisition by Google, Amazon, Meta, Apple, Microsoft of company with >5M users
• Payment network acquiring fintech companies
• Cloud provider acquiring AI model companies
• Vertical integration creating leverage across markets

Burden shift:

• Acquirer must prove merger benefits consumers AND doesn't reduce competition
• Cannot rely on vague "efficiencies" or "synergies"
• Must show specific, quantifiable benefits
• If substantial harm to competition, merger blocked regardless of benefits

Behavioral Remedies Rejected

No more "promises to be good":

• Behavioral conditions (e.g., "we won't preference our products") routinely violated
• Impossible to monitor and enforce
• If merger is anti-competitive, block it—don't try to manage monopoly
• Structural remedies only (divestitures, prohibitions)

Retroactive Review

Past bad mergers can be unwound:

• Facebook/Instagram, Facebook/WhatsApp eligible for unwinding
• Google/YouTube, Google/DoubleClick reviewable
• No statute of limitations on anti-competitive mergers
• If merger was approved based on false promises, can be reversed

Enforcement Mechanisms

Fast-Track Antitrust Court

Current antitrust cases take 5-10 years. Unacceptable in fast-moving tech markets.

Specialized court structure:

• Dedicated antitrust judges with technical expertise
• Economists and technologists as special masters
• 18-month hard deadline from filing to decision
• Appeals limited to constitutional questions only
• Expedited discovery (no delay tactics)

Procedural innovations:

• Sampled document review (not millions of documents)
• Expert testimony in parallel (not sequential)
• Bench trials (no juries in complex cases)
• No continuances absent extraordinary circumstances

Regulatory Authority (FTC/DOJ)

Administrative breakup power:

• FTC/DOJ can order structural separations administratively
• For clear cases (>50% market share, obvious anti-competitive conduct)
• Company can appeal to fast-track court
• But: No injunction stopping breakup during appeal
• Breakup proceeds, reversed only if company wins appeal

Market share monitoring:

• Annual reporting required for companies >$10B revenue
• Market share calculated across relevant markets
• Automatic review if market share >40%
• Triggers investigation, potential breakup proceedings

Penalties

Civil fines:

• Monopolization: Up to 10% of global revenue
• Anti-competitive conduct: $10M per violation
• Merger gun-jumping: $100M + unwinding
• Interoperability violations: $1M per day

Criminal penalties:

• Executives personally liable for knowing violations
• Price-fixing, market allocation: Up to 10 years prison
• Obstruction of antitrust investigation: 5 years
• Cannot hide behind corporate structure

Structural remedies:

• Breakup (separate companies)
• Divestiture (forced sale of assets)
• Prohibition (cannot enter certain markets)
• Interoperability mandate (must open systems)

Gaming Prevention

Common Evasion Tactics

Tactic 1: "We're not a monopoly, just really good"

• Counter: Market share >40% = presumptive monopoly power
• Burden shift: Company must show how consumers benefit
• Reject: "We're efficient" is not a defense if you're eliminating competition

Tactic 2: Regulatory capture

• Problem: Hire regulators, flood with lawyers, delay cases
• Counter: 5-year cooling-off period before regulators can work for companies they regulated
• Funding: Independent funding for antitrust enforcement (not subject to appropriations)
• Staff: Hire from academia/smaller firms, not from companies being regulated

Tactic 3: Breaking up but keeping coordination

• Problem: AT&T Baby Bells coordinated after breakup
• Counter: Former executives cannot sit on boards of separated companies
• Restriction: No shared investors above 5% ownership
• Duration: 10-year prohibition on merging back together

Tactic 4: Buy competitors before they're threats

• Problem: Acquire startups early to eliminate future competition
• Counter: Review triggers at lower thresholds (>5M users, not just revenue)
• Presumption: Dominant platforms acquiring potential competitors = anti-competitive
• Burden: Acquirer must prove acquisition doesn't reduce competition

Tactic 5: International arbitrage

• Problem: Move operations overseas to escape US regulation
• Counter: Market-based enforcement (access to US market conditioned on compliance)
• Coordination: Joint enforcement with EU/UK (combined market too large to ignore)
• Sanctions: Block access if systematically evading antitrust rules

International Coordination

Why Coordination Matters

Tech companies are global. Unilateral US action has limitations:

• Companies can shift operations to friendlier jurisdictions
• US-only breakups create weird competitive dynamics
• Need critical mass of major markets enforcing similar rules

US + EU + UK Alliance

Combined market power:

• US + EU + UK = 800M+ wealthy consumers
• Combined GDP: ~$40 trillion
• Too large for tech companies to ignore
• Present united front: "These are the rules for our markets"

Coordination mechanisms:

• Joint enforcement actions (simultaneous investigations)
• Shared evidence and intelligence
• Harmonized standards for interoperability
• Coordinated merger reviews
• Regular ministerial meetings (like G7/G20 for antitrust)

Precedent:

• EU already aggressive (GDPR, Digital Markets Act, Digital Services Act)
• UK Competition and Markets Authority active post-Brexit
• US can lead by strengthening domestic enforcement first
• Then formalize alliance with proven partners

Implementation

Year 1: US passes comprehensive antitrust reform, demonstrates commitment

Year 1-2: Negotiate formal coordination agreement with EU and UK

Year 2+: Joint enforcement, shared standards, coordinated breakups

Public Alternatives

Government Competition

Public options in digital infrastructure:

Public payment network (FedNow):

• Already covered above in payment infrastructure section
• Government-operated network competing with Visa/Mastercard
• Cost-recovery pricing forces private sector to compete

Public cloud computing (debated):

• Government cloud for public sector workloads
• Could expand to offer services to private sector
• Compete with AWS/Azure/GCP
• Concern: Government not great at tech innovation
• Counter: Don't need innovation, just reliable infrastructure at fair prices

Public digital identity (privacy-preserving):

• See privacy framework for zero-knowledge verification system
• Government-operated identity verification competing with "Sign in with Google/Facebook"
• Privacy-preserving by design (doesn't track you)

Co-op Support

Public funding for platform cooperatives:

• Worker-owned alternatives to gig platforms
• Example: Ride-sharing co-op (drivers own the platform)
• Example: Delivery co-op (couriers own the platform)
• Example: Social media co-op (users govern platform)

Funding mechanisms:

• Grants for co-op formation and technology development
• Low-interest loans for scaling
• Technical assistance (platform development, governance)
• Regulatory advantages (co-ops exempt from certain restrictions)

Interoperability advantage:

• Mandate incumbents interoperate with co-ops
• Uber drivers can get rides from co-op app
• Social media co-ops can communicate with Facebook/Twitter
• Levels playing field for smaller competitors

Success Metrics

End of Year 2 (First Term):

• At least one major tech platform breakup in progress (Amazon, Google, or Meta)
• Common carrier legislation for payment networks passed and enforced
• FedNow consumer payment network operational
• AI competition framework established, blocking vertical integration
• Interoperability mandates (Level 1: data portability) implemented for major platforms
• Merger policy reformed with presumptive blocking for dominant platforms

End of Second Term:

• 2-3 major tech platforms broken up and operating as separate companies
• Service interoperability (Level 2) operational for messaging and social platforms
• Measurable increase in new platform competition (startups growing without being acquired)
• Payment infrastructure market share: 20-30% public option, rest competitive private sector
• No AI monopolies formed (competition maintained across stack)
• Measurable reduction in platform fees (merchant payment fees down to 1-1.5%)

Why This Works

• Addresses root causes: Structural remedies break monopoly power at source
• Fast enforcement: 18-month timeline vs. current 5-10 years
• Clear rules: Bright-line prohibitions eliminate ambiguity
• Multiple tools: Breakups + regulation + public alternatives + interoperability
• International coordination: US + EU + UK prevents evasion
• Gaming-resistant: Anticipates and blocks common evasion tactics
• Politically popular: 70%+ support breaking up tech monopolies
• Future-proof: AI provisions prevent next generation monopolies

Implementation Details

Antitrust lawyers, economists, and technology specialists determine:

• Specific breakup structures for each company (how to divide assets, employees, brands)
• Interoperability technical standards and protocols
• Merger review thresholds and approval criteria
• Court procedures and timeline enforcement mechanisms
• International coordination treaties and joint enforcement procedures
• Market monitoring systems and data collection
• Penalty structures and enforcement escalation
• Public alternative design and implementation (FedNow expansion, co-op support)

The framework provides direction: break up monopolies, mandate interoperability, regulate critical infrastructure, enable competition. Specialists determine optimal implementation.